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Fleck, L.: 2009, Just Caring. Health Care Rationing and
Democratic Deliberation. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. 460 pages. ISBN 987-019512804-8. Price: £28.99
What does it mean to be a ‘‘just’’ and ‘‘caring’’ society
when we have only limited resources to meet virtually
unlimited health care needs? In Just Caring. Health Care
Rationing and Democratic Deliberation Leonard Fleck
identifies health care rationing as the moral problem of
contemporary health care. At present, millions of Ameri-
cans go without health insurance, thousands of whom die
prematurely, unable to afford the health care needed to
save their lives. If these facts run contrary to our sense of
justice, as the author believes they do, health care rationing
decisions are necessary and a fundamental reform of the
American health care system is warranted.
Although Just Caring seems to be written for an
American public primarily, the book is extremely inter-
esting for Europeans as well. Firstly, Fleck provides us
with a very detailed account of the present state of the
American health care system. Secondly, the problems
Americans and their health care have to deal with are not
unique to the United States. Although the American system
seems to result in inequities Western Europeans particu-
larly are largely unfamiliar with, at a more fundamental
level both sides of the Atlantic share an interest in tackling
the same problems: ageing populations, advancing medical
technology and rising costs. In the end every health care
system faces the challenge of meeting virtually unlimited
health care with limited resources.
First of all, the author argues convincingly the inesca-
pability of health care rationing. The so-called ‘‘efficiency
first’’ approach, defended by policy analysts who hold that
health care rationing is unnecessary once all the waste is
removed from the system, is misleading in that the pro-
posals they put forward are very often disguised rationing
decisions themselves. Fleck makes quite clear that greater
efficiency, more astute health care management, or finding
the right incentives to shape the behavior of patients or
physicians is not going to obviate the need for rationing
decisions with life and death consequences for different
individuals or different groups of individuals.
If an individual is in need of health care but is denied
access to health care, such an individual is affected by a
rationing decision if that health care is available to others.
Such decisions are not necessarily morally wrong by
themselves, but the problem is that they tend to be implicit.
Nowadays, rationing decisions are almost never visible and
explicit as rationing decisions. The reasoning is very sel-
dom public and outsiders are denied the opportunity to
correct possible errors. It is not open to critical assessment.
Furthermore, implicit rationing tends to disadvantage the
weak and vulnerable in society, as is made painfully clear
by the numerous examples given by the author. Of course,
as phenomenon implicit rationing is not unique to the
American health care system.
Rationing is primarily a moral problem that ought to be
resolved in accordance with the requirements of morals and
justice. Economic, managerial and organizational consid-
erations come second. Since rationing is generally implicit,
Fleck argues, there is no assured rational relationship
between medical need or likelihood of medical benefit and
the care that is actually provided. Secondly, and equally
important, there is no assured connection between the val-
ues that drive implicit rationing decisions and the values of
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the patients who will be most affected by them. Therefore,
rationing decisions are in need of public justification.
Moreover, rationing should be the result of processes of
rationing democratic deliberation and it will be fair if all who
will be affected by rationing decisions have a fair opportu-
nity to participate in these processes. Since no one has a
moral right to impose rationing decisions on others if they are
unwilling to impose those same rationing decisions on
themselves in the same medical circumstances, all rationing
decisions will ultimately be freely self-imposed.
Drawing from extensive experience with deliberative
community dialogues (with which European readers are
likely to be unfamiliar, unfortunately) Fleck sets out the
ground rules for civic engagement in honest rational dem-
ocratic deliberation, before proposing specific reforms that
are perhaps more of interest to American readers (the
introduction of a single payer system, hard budgets, etc.).
Leonard Fleck has written a well-researched and
important contribution to health care reform. His answer to
the problem of just distribution of health care is some kind
of ongoing societal conversation. What is needed to get
that conversation up and running the author describes at
length. Whether such an idea will materialize in American
politics is yet to be seen.
Martin Buijsen
Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Baertschi, B.: 2009, La neuroe´thique. Ce que les neurosci-
ences font a` nos conceptions morales. Paris: E´ditions La
De´couverte. 165 pages. ISBN: 978-2707157096. Price: € 18
Neuroethics has been broadly defined as the study of the
ethical, legal and social implications of neuroscience (Judy
Illes). The book by Bernard Baertschi of the University of
Geneva represents to my knowledge the first attempt to
offer an account of this emerging field within the French-
speaking world.
Following Adina Roskies, the author distinguishes two
main divisions of neuroethics: the ethics of neuroscience,
and the neuroscience of ethics. The first one can be sub-
divided into two groups of topics: the first concerns the
ethical issues in the design and conduct of neuroscientific
studies, and includes topics already familiar to those
working in bioethics, such as informed consent, privacy,
risk assessment, etc., but which are specifically applied to
the field of neuroscience. On the contrary, the second
subdivision of the ethics of neuroscience is truly novel. It
aims to investigate the impact of our growing under-
standing of brain function on our ethical, social, and
philosophical conceptions. It includes issues like personal
identity, freedom and responsibility, consciousness, and
the mind–body problem. Most of the topics covered by
Baertschi’s book are relevant to this second subcategory of
issues. The second main division of neuroethics, the neu-
roscience of ethics, is interested in investigating the brain
bases of moral cognition and ethical decisions, and is
covered in the third chapter of the book.
The volume is divided into four chapters. The first
chapter outlines the important role that emotions play in
our moral decisions. According to the author, saying that
our moral choices are, or should be, rational and conscious
does not imply that emotions should be excluded from
them, as some philosophers, Kant in particular, tend to
argue. Precisely the new neuroscientific discoveries show
that emotions are to some extent related to a group of
structures in the brain, and can play a positive role in our
moral choices.
The second chapter deals with an even more complex
dilemma: is the notion of personal freedom compatible
with neurosciences? In other words, are we responsi-
ble for our actions if they are physically caused by our
brains? Baertschi defends a compatibilist view according
to which brain determinism is compatible with free will,
on the grounds that they operate at two different levels:
while free will belongs to a metaphysical dimension,
determinism is an ‘‘internal’’ condition of individuals. He
claims that, insofar as people are not externally coerced
and are mentally competent, they can be regarded as
‘‘free’’ and therefore ‘‘responsible’’ for their deeds, even if
they are determined by their brains to act in a particular
way. This position is, of course, not without its problems.
One may wonder whether compatibilism does not beg the
real question about personal freedom. Is the lack of coercion
and of any internal incapacitating condition really sufficient
for free will? Does not the common understanding of free
will refer to genuine alternate possibilities for action, rather
than merely the absence of negative conditions?
The third chapter explores the moral problems posed by
brain imaging, and the supposed possibilities of ‘‘reading’’
the people’s thoughts with help of the new instruments
provided by neurosciences. In this regard, Baertschi is,
with reason, rather cautious about saying that brain scan-
ning really reproduces—or may one day reproduce—the
thoughts of individuals.
Finally, the fourth chapter offers a detailed account of the
current debate on the ethical acceptability of brain enhance-
ment. The author provides an insightful analysis of the pros
and cons of various neurotechnologies that may enhance
cognitive and behavioural skills. In particular, he examines
the argument that neuroenhancements would interfere with
people’s ability to live authentic lives.
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In sum, this book fills a real gap in the literature in
French on neuroethics, and represents a very valuable
contribution to a better understanding of this emerging and
challenging field.
Roberto Andorno
Zurich, Switzerland
Cortina, A.: 2009, Las fronteras de la persona. El valor de
los animales, la dignidad de los humanos. Madrid: Taurus.
240 pages. ISBN 978-84-306-0765-5. Price: € 19, 50
The development of Adela Cortina’s philosophy since her
now classical E´tica Mı´nima (1986) up to her recent award-
winning E´tica de la razo´n cordial (2007) has contributed to
building up of one of the most fruitful and original lines of
thought in the contemporary philosophical scene. The roots
of her thought have to be sought in Kant, Habermas and
Apel. In her new book, Adela Cortina takes an in-depth
look at the moral questions stemming from our relation-
ships with other animals. Is it possible to respect human
dignity and the value of non-human animals at the same
time? Upon what philosophical ideas must we base our
standpoint? Is it really necessary to recognize animal
rights?
Before giving us her own answer, Adela Cortina offers a
review of the major current ideas. In the first place, she
speaks of Contractualism, with its aspects of value and its
limitations. Animals, of course, cannot be parties to the
social contract. But they can benefit from it, as long as the
contract goes beyond the mere selfishness of the mutual
benefit of its signatories. Such a procedure would give
them protection without the need to give them any doubtful
rights prior to the social pact.
The second philosophical current which comes in for her
criticism is Utilitarianism, some of whose exponents seem
to display a certain incoherence. On the one hand, they
claim rights for animals but, on the other hand, they do not
seriously believe even in the existence of human rights as
natural rights or pre-social ones. This shows that, for them,
to claim rights for animals is just a rhetorical or political
strategy.
She goes on to analyse Amartya Sen’s capabilities
approach. Its application to the case of animals, as mooted
by Martha Nussbaum, is rather lacking on some points,
according to Adela Cortina. The fact that animals are able
to enjoy flourishing lives does not mean that they have
rights. The title of Cortina’s new book, Las fronteras de la
persona (‘‘Frontiers of the Person’’) could be seen as a
response to Nussbaum’s Frontiers of Justice.
Fourthly, a review is offered of the theories of inherent
value. The author detects again a passage from values to
rights which is not satisfactorily justified in these theories.
The author’s personal position could be summarized
thus: only human beings have any dignity prior to any
social agreement. The mutual recognition of this in history
becomes what we know as human rights. Nevertheless, this
mutual recognition of human dignity should not be
understood in terms of species egoism or simple mutual
benefit. It goes beyond that and can benefit others. It must
benefit all those living beings who, like animals, have
inherent value. Therefore, to avoid animals suffering, it is
neither necessary, nor a good idea to extend and dilute the
function of rights.
One question remains to be answered: Do disabled
human beings possess dignity? Adela Cortina’s answer is
emphatically affirmative. Although they are unable to
exercise all their capabilities, this ‘‘does not make them
members of other species, but people who have to be
helped’’ (p. 225).
To sum up, this is a book that examines in depth the
moral questions of our relationship with animals, while
giving a clear presentation of the different philosophical
positions on this issue and offering the author’s own ori-
ginal proposition, which is well grounded and eminently
sensible.
Alfredo Marcos
Valladolid, Spain
Seidel, W.: 2009, Das ethische Gehirn. Heidelberg: Spek-
trum Akademischer Verlag. 221 pages. ISBN 978-3-8274-
2126-5. Price: € 19,95
The question whether subjectively free choices are deter-
mined by specific brain activity several seconds ahead of
time occupies an important place in the emerging field of
neuroethics. After Benjamin Libet and his numerous fol-
lowers, it is now John-Dylan Haynes who is disturbing our
idea of a free will by identifying via fMRT a certain brain
activity in the parietal and prefrontal cortex. In this brain
activity Haynes found encoded a decision up to 10 s before
it entered awareness. But not only empirical studies like
this raise new controversies in this field. Philosophers have
debated about the free will for more than two millennia. In
his book about ‘‘The ethical brain’’, Wolfgang Seidel, a
former surgeon, who is now publishing on emotional
psychology, not only tries to give a review of core argu-
ments of this debate. He also aims at building a bridge
between diverging views and at pointing out implications
for our view of moral responsibility.
Seidel starts his book by introducing the debate about
the existence of a free will and its main arguments. He then
continues in chapters 2 and 3 by giving the wider back-
ground of the discussion and explaining the decision-
making process from a scientific (and causalistic) point of
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view. In chapter 4, Seidel presents his main psychology-
based arguments for an existence not of a free, but of an
own will, with which he characterizes the individual ability
of the brain to modify relevant causes. After highlighting
key benefits of experiencing the freedom of our will from a
psychological point of view (chapter 5), Seidel tries to
integrate in the following chapter the results of neurosci-
entific research by Libet and Haynes into his concept of an
own will. According to Seidel, even if there is indeed
unconscious brain activity, in which a decision is encoded
several seconds before it reaches awareness, this does not
mean that our own conscious will is irrelevant for the
decision-making. Not the actual decision-making and ini-
tiation of action is the function of our conscious will, but
long-term processes of pondering, planning and balancing
which in the end do result in the described modification of
relevant causes. With regard to our perception of moral
responsibility Seidel outlines in chapters 7 and 8 that dis-
tinguishing between a free or own will has no relevant
implications for our idea of guilt or culpability. Due to its
ability to modify relevant causes and thereby to govern
behaviour, the brain nevertheless is responsible for actions.
Das ethische Gehirn (The ethical brain) can be a useful
introduction into the debate about the free will from a
scientific point of view, and provides valuable insight into
some recent research in the field of psychology. It is
written in a clear language and can be regarded as a pop-
ular scientific book, in the best sense of the expression, as it
makes a complex issue accessible to a broad readership.
Dagmar Schmitz
Aachen, Germany
Sass, H.M.: 2007, Bioethics and Biopolitics. Beijing Lec-
tures by an European Scholar. Xian City: Fourth Military
Medical University Press. 430 pages. ISBN 978-7-81086-
296-7/R278. Price: RMB (China Yuan Renminbi) 32.00
This volume comprises 10 lectures on bioethics and bio-
politics (both in English and in Chinese), which were given
by Professor Hans-Martin Sass at the classes and work-
shops with students and colleagues at Peking Union
Medical College. For 25 years, Professor Sass has been
engaged in exchanging knowledge and experiences with
Chinese scholars. As I was reading this book, I was
astonished to find that he is very familiar with the tradi-
tional Chinese literature on medical ethics. The issues in
this volume often start with a multicultural approach, and
then they are transformed into golden rules, which are
pretty compatible with Chinese culture.
Chapter 1 discusses the similarities and controversies of
bioethics from various traditional backgrounds. The author
emphasizes that the development of a Chinese bioethics
should be based on its own cultural heritage rather than
importing sets of principles from other traditions. Follow-
ing the Confucian physician Gong Tingxian’s model of
interactive rules for the physician and the patient, the
author presents a set of eight interactive golden rules for
stakeholders in health care. Chapter 2 focuses on the
existence of universal ethics. Nevertheless, its expression
might vary with different emphases across the culture.
Hence, in the practice of treating ‘‘moral strangers’’, we
need to hold the view that respect for human dignity
includes the respect for human diversity, as well as for
conceptual differences and dissenting positions on deep
philosophical and religious convictions.
Chapter 3 presents an interactive model of communi-
cation-in-trust and cooperation-in-trust, which includes
three possible methods, the narrative model, the risk
assessment model, and the checklist model. Chapter 4
demonstrates that the Internet has the power to contribute
to the democratization of medical knowledge, as it pro-
vides lay person information platform for diseases, health
and wellness. On the other hand, a certain level of quality
assurance and quality control is necessary in order to
protect people from fraud and disinformation and to make
communication-in-trust possible. The following chapters,
from 5 to 9, discuss in detail different aspects of bioeth-
ics, including individual health risk assessment, medical
research, human experimentation, public health care, and
health care crisis. Finally, chapter 10 proposes that the
better biopolitics and health care policy should be aimed at
health care rather than merely disease management, by
providing useful information to individuals and empower-
ing them to care for health. In addition, it is also important
to establish just and efficient health care systems.
This book makes a valuable contribution to our under-
standing of bioethics and biopolitics from a cross-cultural
point of view. I hope it could serve as a reference book for
the reformation of the Chinese medical health system.
Xiaochen Hu
Tu¨bingen, Germany
Illhardt, F.-J. (ed.): 2008, Die ausgeblendete Seite der
Autonomie. Kritik eines bioethischen Prinzips. Mu¨nster:
LIT Verlag. 238 pages. ISBN 978-3-8258-1113-6. Price:
€ 34, 90
This book is a result of the editor’s many years of expe-
rience as a member of the ethics committee of the Uni-
versity of Freiburg, Germany. It offers not so much a
general critique of the principle of respect for autonomy—
as the subtitle may suggest—but rather a collection of
interesting papers highlighting some of the limitations of
patient autonomy in various clinical contexts.
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The first part of the book presents various autonomy-
related dilemmas in clinical practice. Monika Keller offers
a psychological perspective on informed consent in situa-
tions in which patients experience disease, existential fear,
and suffering. Michael Hu¨ll stresses the relevance of trust
in medical decision-making and argues against a strategy
which merely focuses on information transfer within the
doctor-patient-relationship. Based on the results of a
questionnaire study, Gerhild Becker and Carola Xander
argue towards shared decision-making in palliative care.
Afterwards, Klaus Henninghausen and Eberhard Schulz
discuss ethical aspects related to decision-making compe-
tence in children and adolescents, whereas Inga West-
ermilies examines issues arising in multicultural contexts.
The focus of Franz Josef Illhardt’s contribution is on
medical research involving vulnerable persons.
The second part of the book illustrates several theoret-
ical frameworks. These serve to shed a different light on
the debate on autonomy which—at least in medical eth-
ics—often is dominated by aspects such as independence
and free decision-making. First, Joachim Boldt gives an
introduction to the role of autonomy in Søren Kierkeg-
aard’s thinking. Then Annette Hilt discusses Helmuth
Plessner’s concept of autonomy which is tightly linked to
man’s eccentricity and Plessner’s characterization of man
as ‘‘homo absconditus’’. Rolf Lachmann’s contribution is
written from the point of view of process philosophy,
whereas Martin W. Schnell examines autonomy in Paul
Ricoeur’s philosophy.
The contributions to the third part of the book are about
ethical issues in doctor-patient-relationships with a partic-
ular focus on aspects of relevance beyond patient auton-
omy. Klaus Do¨rner accentuates the need for a good and
responsible doctor. Hildburg Kindt emphasizes the rele-
vance of an open dialogue, reciprocity and respect in the
doctor-patient-relationship. Franz Josef Illhardt argues
towards shared decision-making. Gabriele Lucius-Hoene’s
contribution is written from the point of view of narrative
ethics, whereas Heinz Schott discusses doctor–patient-
relationships from a historical perspective.
In sum, the book provides very thoughtful texts worth
reading on the limitations of patient autonomy. What one
misses, however, is a chapter giving a balanced and com-
prehensive view on the concept of autonomy—which in
fact is not as individualistic as some of the authors seem to
assume.
Elisabeth Hildt
Mainz, Germany
Freeman, M. and Goodenough, O. (eds.): 2009, Law, mind
and brain. Aldershot: Ashgate. 430 pages. ISBN 978-0-
7546-7013-1. Price: $ 69,95
This volume, edited by Michael Freeman and Oliver R.
Goodenough, offers a good outline of an important and
topical issue within the field of neurosciences. Whereas
recent publications have mainly focused on criminal law
aspects of the use of neuroscientific measurement tech-
niques in court trials, the book by Freeman and Goodenough
explores further legal implications, which might become
relevant and are in need of legal regulation. This is why the
range of topics reaches from more general topics like ‘‘Law,
responsibility and the brain’’, over most discussed items
such as brain imaging and courtroom evidence, and reaches
out to questions about involuntary treatment, problems of
determining a person’s capacity and therefore an adult’s
opportunity to file a suit in court trials, as well as questions
on end-of-life decisions, with special regard to research
projects, and also dealing with mostly overseen aspects of
family law, which becomes increasingly important in the
context of neuroscientific developments.
The book makes clear that society is on the way to a new
era of neuroscientific advances and that the amount of new
legal problems will lead to the emergence of a distinct
neurolaw. Unlike former publications, the book shows that
the impact of neurosciences is not circumscribed to crim-
inal law. It expresses the hope that, more generally, neu-
rosciences might one day be able to help understand our
intuitions concerning free will and responsibility, which
would be a giant step for several fields of the neurolegal
debate. Regarding involuntary treatment, the book suggests
to no longer distinguish between the categories of mental
and physical disorders, but to replace these categories by
the more general field of a unique involuntary treatment
scheme (special regard is paid in this context to the right of
the children). This leads to the next topic, which deals with
the thesis that understanding the brains of children might
be the key to understand the thoughts of juvenile offenders.
The neuroscientific debate should therefore raise questions
about current concepts of culpability, accountability and
punishment, especially with regard to the question whether
or not standards of adult’s trials should be transferred to
cases of juvenile offenders or not. Later in the book it is
shown that recent neuroscientific developments might also
have an impact on legal regulations about end-of-life
decisions.
In sum, this excellent treatise not only contains a col-
lection of very interesting papers characterized by in-depth
analysis of most relevant aspects of neuroscientific devel-
opments, but also corrects a common misunderstanding,
according to which only criminal law is challenged by
neurosciences.
Tade M. Spranger
Bonn, Germany
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